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Abstract
There lies a network structure between ﬁxed tree and minimum cost spanning
tree networks that has not been previously analyzed from a cooperative game the-
oretic perspective, namely, directed acyclic graph (DAG) networks. In this paper
we consider the cost allocation game deﬁned on DAG-networks. We brieﬂy discuss
the relation of DAG-games with other network-based cost games. We demonstrate
that in general a DAG-game is not concave, even its core might be empty, but we
provide an eﬃciently veriﬁable condition satisﬁed by a large class of directed acyclic
graphs that is suﬃcient for balancedness of the associated DAG-game. We introduce
a network canonization process and prove various structural results for the core of
canonized DAG-games. In particular, we characterize classes of coalitions that have
a constant payoﬀ in the core. In addition, we identify a subset of the coalitions that
is suﬃcient to determine the core.
Keywords: Cooperative game theory, Directed acyclic graphs, Core, Acyclic
directed Steiner tree
JEL-codes: C71
1 Introduction
Standard tree games form one of the most studied class of cost allocation games. In
its most basic form (Megiddo, 1978), we have a (directed) tree, where nodes represent
players, arcs represent connection possibilities between the nodes, and a non-negative
∗The author thanks the funding of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences under its Momentum Pro-
gramme (LD-004/2010).
†Research was funded by OTKA grant K108383.
‡Research was funded by OTKA grant K101224 and by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences under its
Momentum Programme (LD-004/2010).
1
connection cost is assigned to each arc. There is a special node, the so called root of
the tree. This node represents the provider of some kind of service (e.g. electricity) that
can be obtained via the given tree network and the quality of which does not depend on
whether the connection is direct or goes through other nodes. The aim of every player
is to get connected to the root and receive that service. The cost of an arc, however,
is incurred only once, no matter how many players use that link, so forming coalitions
results in cost savings. The main question is how to allocate the connection costs between
the players to induce cooperation.
More general versions of the cost allocation problem on ﬁxed tree networks were con-
sidered by Granot, Maschler, Owen, and Zhu (1996) and Maschler, Potters, and Reijnierse
(2010). The closest to our setting is the standard tree enterprise discussed by Maschler,
Potters, and Reijnierse (2010). We also allow nodes in the network where no player resides
or nodes with more than one residents. Further, we also assume non-negative costs on the
arcs and zero costs on the nodes. We, however, generalize the structure of the network
by assuming that it is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) in which players can have multiple
routes to the root. Naturally, players that have more than one possible way to reach the
root have more bargaining power when it comes down to sharing the costs.
A typical economic situation that can be modeled in this way is the cost allocation
of infrastructural developments. Consider for example a group of towns that would like
to connect themselves to a water reserve. Clearly not every town has to build a direct
pipeline to the source. A possible solution is to connect the nearest towns with each other
and then one of the towns with the reserve. The towns that are already connected to the
water system can force the rest to pay some of their construction cost, otherwise they
can close down the outgoing water ﬂow. On the other hand, no town can be forced to
pay more than the cost of directly connecting itself to the water reserve. Bergantiños,
Lorenzo, and Lorenzo-Freire (2010) and Dutta and Kar (2004) provide further examples
of this kind.
One of the consequence of the more general network structure is that even under the
aforementioned standardization assumptions the computation of the cost of a coalition
(i.e. ﬁnding the cheapest subnetwork that connects all players in the coalition to the root)
amounts to solving the so-called acyclic directed Steiner tree problem1, which is NP-hard
(Hwang, Richards, and Winter, 1992). The computation of the entire cost function for all
coalitions, therefore, could be prohibitive in practice. Another important consequence is
that, unlike for standard tree games, the core of the cost game associated to our standard
DAG-network might be empty, so a stable solution of the cost allocation problem might
not exist. We provide a suﬃcient condition for non-emptiness of the core that is satisﬁed
1Also known as the Steiner arborescence problem.
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for a large class of directed acyclic graph games. Unlike for standard tree games, even
these canonical DAG-games need not be concave. We provide further structural results
with respect to the core. We identify 'free riders' i.e. players that does not pay anything
in any core allocation. Additionally, we characterize coalitions that have a constant zero
excess in the core. Finally we introduce the concept of dually essential coalitions - a
relatively small class of coalitions which are suﬃcient in themselves to determine the
linear inequality system that describes the core. We ﬁrmly believe that these results
could be utilized in the computation of the nucleolus, or other core-related cooperative
solutions for canonical DAG-games.
Although we deal with cost allocation problems on a rooted directed network, some
of our results resemble well-known properties of monotonic minimum cost spanning tree
(mMCST) games that are associated with undirected networks (Bird, 1976; Granot and
Huberman, 1981, 1984; Granot and Maschler, 1998). On the other hand airport games
(Potters and Sudhölter, 1999) and irrigation games (Márkus, Pintér, and Radványi, 2011)
are special cases of our proposed model. Shortest path games, peer group games and
highway games are also very similar in their concept (Rosenthal, 2013; Brânzei, Fragnelli,
and Tijs, 2002; Çiftçi, Borm, and Hamers, 2010). Note that each of these games have a
non-empty core. In order to give more insight into our model let us compare airport games,
standard tree games, DAG-network games, and minimum cost spanning tree games. These
games have the same setup, namely they are based on a rooted graph, where players 
who are located on the nodes  would like to share the construction cost of the edges.
Table 1 summarizes the diﬀerences of these games, while Figure 1 shows how they are
related to each other.
Game Graph Edges Players/node Convexity Core
Airport path (un)directed 0− n concave non-empty
Standard Tree tree (un)directed 0− n concave non-empty
DAG connected DAG directed 0− n not concave can be empty
mMCST connected undirected 1 not concave non-empty
Table 1: Comparison of graph related cost games
Notice that in case of airport games and standard tree games the edges can be con-
sidered both directed or undirected.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the second section we introduce the game
theoretical framework used in the paper. In the third we formally deﬁne directed acyclic
graph games. In the forth section we propose a network canonization process and describe
its implications. In the ﬁfth section we discuss the structural results with respect to the
core. Finally we conclude our ﬁndings with some remarks and we review the possible
directions for future research especially related to the nucleolus of the game.
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Standard Tree
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Games DAG-games
Figure 1: Venn-diagram of graph related cost games
2 Game theoretical framework
A cooperative cost game is an ordered pair (N, c) consisting of the player set N =
{1, 2, . . . , n} and a characteristic cost function c : 2N → R with c(∅) = 0. The value
c(S) represent how much cost coalition S must bear if it chooses to act separately from
the rest of the players. Let us denote a speciﬁc cost game by Γ. A cost game Γ = (N, c)
is said to be concave2 if its characteristic function is submodular, i.e. if
c(S) + c(T ) ≥ c(S ∪ T ) + c(S ∩ T ), ∀ S, T ⊆ N.
A solution for a cost allocation game is a vector x ∈ RN . For convenience, we introduce
the following notations x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi for any S ⊆ N , and instead of x({i}) we simply
write x(i). A solution is called eﬃcient if x(N) = c(N) and individually rational if
x(i) ≤ c(i) for all i ∈ N . The imputation set of the game X(Γ) consists of the eﬃcient
and individually rational solutions, formally,
X(Γ) = {x ∈ RN | x(N) = c(N), x(i) ≤ c(i) for all i ∈ N}.
Given an allocation x ∈ RN , we deﬁne the excess of a coalition S as
exc(S, x) := c(S)− x(S).
The core of the cost allocation game C(Γ) is a set-valued solution where all the excesses
are non-negative. Formally,
C(Γ) = {x ∈ RN | x(N) = c(N), x(S) ≤ c(S) for all S ⊆ N}.
Simpliﬁcations could be possible in the linear system deﬁning the core if we focus on
the following two types of coalitions.
Deﬁnition 1 (Essential coalitions). Coalition S is called essential in game Γ = (N, c) if it
can not be partitioned as S = S1
.∪ . . . .∪Sk with k ≥ 2 such that c(S) ≥ c(S1)+ . . .+ c(Sk).
2Sometimes submodular cost games are called convex instead of concave in the same way we usually
speak of the core of a cost game instead of its anti-core. This terminology is appealing since for instance
Kuipers's results Kuipers (1996) on convex games naturally extends to concave cost games.
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Essential coalitions were introduced in (Huberman, 1980) in order to show that they
form a characterization set for the nucleolus. For more on characterisation sets see (Gra-
not, Granot, and Zhu, 1998). By deﬁnition, the singleton coalitions are always essential in
every game. It is easily seen that each not essential (i.e. inessential) coalition has a weakly
minorizing partition which consists exclusively of essential coalitions. Moreover, the core
is determined by the eﬃciency equation x(N) = c(N) and the x(S) ≤ c(S) inequalities
corresponding to the essential coalitions, all the other inequalities can be discarded from
the core system.
This observation helps us to eliminate large coalitions which are redundant for the
core. We can identify the small redundant coalitions, if we apply idea of essentiality to
the dual game. The dual game (N, c∗) of game (N, c) is deﬁned by the coalitional function
c∗(S) := c(N)− c(N \ S) for all S ⊆ N . Clearly, c∗(∅) = 0 and c∗(N) = c(N).
Deﬁnition 2 (Dually essential coalitions). Coalition S is called dually essential in game
Γ = (N, c) if its complement can not be partitioned as N \ S = (N \ T1)
.∪ . . . .∪ (N \ Tk)
with k ≥ 2 such that c∗(N \ S) ≤ c∗(N \ T1) + . . . + c∗(N \ Tk), or equivalently, c(S) ≥
c(T1) + . . .+ c(Tk)− (k − 1)c(N).
Notice that each member of S appears in all of the coalitions T1, ..., Tk, but every
other player appears only in exactly k − 1 times in this family. We call such a system of
coalitions an overlapping decomposition of S.3
By deﬁnition, all (n − 1)-player coalitions are dually essential in any game. It is
easily checked that if S and T are not dually essential coalitions and T appears in an
overlapping decomposition of S, then S cannot appear in an overlapping decomposition
of T , consequently, each coalition that is not dually essential (i.e. dually inessential)
has a weakly minorizing overlapping decomposition which consists exclusively of dually
essential coalitions. Moreover, the core of (N, c) can also be determined by the dual
eﬃciency equation x(N) = c∗(N) and the x(S) ≥ c∗(S) dual inequalities corresponding
to the complements of the dually essential coalitions, all the other dual inequalities can
be discarded from the dual core system.
It can be easily veriﬁed (e.g. by applying Theorem 2.3 in (Granot, Granot, and Zhu,
1998)) that dually essential coalitions characterize the nucleolus as well. We intend to
construct an eﬃcient algorithm for the nucleolus in a subsequent paper based on the
structural results presented here.
3For a more general deﬁnition, where the complements of the overlapping coalitions need not form
a partition of the complement coalition, see e.g. (Brânzei, Solymosi, and Tijs, 2005) and the references
therein.
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3 Deﬁnition and basic properties of the game
A directed acyclic graph network D or shortly a DAG-network is given by the following:
• G(V,A) is a directed acyclic graph, with a special node - the so called root of G,
denoted by r - such that from each other node of G there leads at least one directed
path to the root. G is considered to be a simple graph, i.e. it has no loops or parallel
arcs.
• There is a cost function δ : A→ R+ ∪ {0} that assigns a non-negative real number
to each arc. This value is regarded as the construction cost of the arc.
For a subgraph T , V (T ) denotes the node set of T . Similarly A(T ) denotes its arc
set, while Ap is used for the set of arcs that leave node p. We call nodes that have
one leaving arc passages, while nodes that have more than one leaving arcs are called
junctions. Junctions that have more than one leaving zero cost arcs (or simply zero arcs)
are called gates.
Let N be a set of players and let R : N → V \{r} be the residency function that maps
N to the node set of G. If player i is assigned to node p we say that player i resides at
p. A node is occupied if at least one player resides in it. Note that unoccupied leafs are
redundant and can be omitted from the network. The residency function is not assumed
to be injective and/or surjective, but it is a proper function. It means that any one player
resides at exactly one node (the root is excluded), but there can be other unoccupied
nodes or nodes having more than one residents. The set of residents of a subgraph T is
denoted by N(T ), formally, N(T ) = R−1(V (T )).
For a subgraph T , we deﬁne its construction cost C(T ) as the total cost of the arcs in
T , i.e. C(T ) =
∑
a∈A(T ) δ(a). A path whose end point is the root is called a rooted path.
A connected subgraph of G that is a union of rooted paths is called a trunk. For each
coalition S, let TS denote the set of trunks that have maximum number of arcs among
the cheapest trunks that connect all players in S to the root. We say that a trunk T
corresponds to a node set B if V (T ) = B. Similarly we say that a coalition S corresponds
to the trunk T if T ∈ TS. Note that more than one coalition can correspond to the same
trunk.
The characteristic function of the cost allocation game that is associated with the pair
(D,R), or shortly a DAG-game (D,R), is deﬁned as follows.
c(D,R)(S)
def
= C(T ) T ∈ TS.
The deﬁnition is motivated by the fact that by leaving the grand coalition the players in
S need not pay more than c(D,R)(S) to get connected to the root. As any trunk in TS has
the same construction cost, c(D,R)(S) is well-deﬁned.
6
It is straightforward to see that the characteristic function of any DAG-game is non-
negative, monotone and subadditive (even strongly subadditive, i.e. c(S)+c(T ) ≥ c(S∪T )
holds for any not necessarily disjoint coalitions S and T ). On the other hand, Figure 2/A
shows an example when a stronger property, submodularity is not satisﬁed.
Let S1 = {1, 3} and S2 = {2, 3}, then
3 + 2 = c(S1) + c(S2) < c(S1 ∪ S2) + c(S1 ∩ S2) = 4 + 2,
thus we conclude that DAG-games need not be concave.
The following example demonstrates that DAG-games need not even be balanced.
Consider the DAG-network (D,R) depicted in Figure 2/B. The cost of connecting any
two-player coalition is 3, however c(D,R)(N) = 5 which leaves the core empty.
r r
c{3}
b{2}a{1}
Example A Example B
0
3
1
1
1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1
g{1}
e{2} f{3}
a b c
Figure 2: The ﬁrst example shows that the characteristic function need not be submodular.
Example B displays a DAG-network that induces a cost game with an empty core. The
residents of the nodes are given in braces in both cases.
Later we will show that the condition
(*) there must be a resident at each node with more than one entering arc and with
leaving arc(s) all of positive cost
is suﬃcient for a DAG-game to have a non-empty core. Notice that property (*) can be
checked eﬃciently. In the following we will assume that (*) holds for any (D,R) network.
Finally we note that in general it is computationally hard to calculate the characteristic
function value of a given coalition. Finding an element of TS for an arbitrary S ⊂ N is
equivalent to the acyclic directed Steiner tree problem, which is  as we mentioned earlier
 NP-hard.
4 The canonization process and its consequences
We say that DAG-game Γ(D,R) is in canonical form if the following properties are fulﬁlled:
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P1 Each junction has a leaving zero arc.
P2 For each passage the cost of the leaving arc is positive.
P3 There resides a player in each passage.
P4 Each arc is used at least by one coalition.
To transform a DAG-game into a form where property P1 is fulﬁlled we have to per-
form the following procedure for each node p ∈ V such that |Ap| ≥ 2 and mine∈Ap δ(a) =
αp > 0.
1. Introduce an unoccupied new node p′ with the same set of leaving arcs as p has,
but reduce the cost of the arcs by αp.
2. Erase all the arcs that leave p.
3. Finally introduce a new arc from p to p′ with cost αp.
Property P2 can be achieved by contracting each passage that has a leaving zero arc
with the endnode of that arc, by uniting the resident sets of the contracted nodes, and by
eliminating that zero arc. Obtaining both P1 and P2 require equivalent transformations
in the sense that the construction cost of the trunks in TS is unchanged for any coalition
S.
If p is an unoccupied passage and p has only one entering arc then it can be omitted
from the network. The entering and leaving arc of p can be replaced by a single arc with
the aggregated construction cost. Needless to say that this procedure does not change
the costs of the TS trunks either. Note that if a passage has more than one entering arc
then by property (*) it is occupied.
Finally arcs not used in any of the TS subgraphs can be deleted, since they do not
aﬀect the characteristic function. Checking P4 could be computationally demanding.
However, we only need it to simplify the proofs, P4 can be neglected for the algorithms.
Figure 3 illustrates the canonization process.
Our ﬁrst observation summarizes the above ﬁndings.
Observation 3.
• All networks that satisfy (*) can be canonized.
• The characteristic function is unaﬀected by the canonization process.
Although canonization ensures that TN contains only a single element, this cannot be
said in general about other such sets of trunks. In the following we will assume that TS
contains only a single trunk for any coalition S. This can always be achieved by perturbing
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r r
c{2} d{3}
e{4,5}
b{1}
a
2 3
5 3
20 2
3
D Dc
c{2} d{3}
f
e{4,5}
b{1}
0 1
5 3
5
2
Figure 3: A DAG-network with player set N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} before and after canonization.
the positive arc costs. We will refer to TS as this unique trunk that has maximum number
of arcs among the cheapest trunks that connect all members of S to the root.
As the residency function R becomes ﬁxed after the canonization, from now on we
will drop it from the notation and simply write cD. We will denote by ΓD the cost game
induced by cD, i.e. ΓD = (N, cD). Let us now see some consequences of canonization. We
also need to introduce further notions and notations.
For each node p, the cheapest arcs in Ap are called TN -arcs. The name comes from
the fact that (if P1 holds) an arc is a TN -arc if and only if it is an element of A(TN).
If a, a′ ∈ Ap, a is a TN -arc and δ(a′) > δ(a), then a′ is called a shortcut. Thus every
arc that is not a TN -arc is a shortcut. If there exists a shortcut between p and q it is
always cheaper than any alternative path between these two nodes due to P4 and the
non-negativity of the arc costs (hence the name). If a, a′ ∈ Ap are TN -arcs then the
construction cost of both a and a′ is zero (this is a consequence of P1).
The subgraph associated to the grand coalition (TN) holds special importance. First
this is the graph that will be constructed in the end. All the other arcs are only good for
improving the bargaining positions of certain players. Note that TN is not necessarily a
tree as it may contain some additional zero arcs4. Secondly, TN induces a partial order ≺
on the nodes. We say that p is a ancestor of q 6= p if p can be reached from q via a path
in TN , we denote this by p ≺ q. In such cases we also say that q is an descendant of p.
Node p is a direct ancestor or parent of q if p is an ancestor of q and they are connected
with a TN -arc. This relation is denoted by pi(q) whenever the direct ancestor is unique
(gates have more than one parent). If p is a parent of q then q is referred as a direct
4Unlike other trunks, TN can be constructed eﬃciently in linear time. The connection cost of any
occupied node is at least as much as the cost of the cheapest arc that leaves that node. Furthermore
every unoccupied node has a leaving zero arc, therefore connecting an unoccupied node does not impose
extra cost. Thus including the cheapest arcs from every node connects all nodes to the root. It follows
that V (TN ) = V and E(TN ) contains every arc that is not a shortcut.
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descendant or child of p. The node set that contains p together with its descendants is
called a full branch and denoted by Bp.
Sometimes we are interested only in some of the descendants of p therefore we cut oﬀ
some segments of Bp. Removing a node from Bp other nodes can become unreachable
too. A speciﬁc branch, denoted by BQp is a subset of Bp that collects nodes that still can
reach p using only TN -arcs after removing the node set Q from Bp. Formally
BQp
def
=
{
q ∈ Bp | ∃ Pq−p such that V (Pq−p) ⊂ Bp \Q
}
,
where Pq−p denotes a path in TN that leads from q to p. In other words a branch is the
node set of a union of paths in TN which have a common origin. To emphasize this a
BQp branch is also called a p-branch. Note that if B
Q
p = B
Q′
p then B
Q∩Q′
p deﬁne the same
node set as well. We say that the BQp branch is in standard form if the cardinality of Q
is minimal, in other words if there exists no Q′ such that BQ
′
p = B
Q
p and |Q′| < |Q|.
We say that the node set B is proper if deleting B from G along with all of its entering
and leaving arcs the root can still be reached on a directed path from any of the remaining
nodes (i.e. the remaining graph is a trunk).
Let us illustrate the above introduced notions and notations with some examples.
Consider again the canonized DAG-network Dc depicted in Figure 3. The only shortcut
in Dc is the one that connects node f with node d. All the other arcs are TN -arcs. The
full branch Bd contains only node d, since d 6≺ f . Furthermore, Bd is a proper branch, for
removing d together with the entering and leaving arcs the graph is still a trunk. Finally,
the node set that corresponds to the trunk T{1,3,4} is V \Bfc and cDc({1, 3, 4}) = 11.
Finally we conclude this chapter with a representation lemma that helps us visualize
the graph structure of trunks.
Lemma 4. The node set of every trunk that corresponds to a coalition S ⊂ N can be
obtained by deleting some branches from V . The removed branches can be chosen in such
way that each of them originates from a passage. Formally for any S ⊂ N there exists
Q1, . . . , Qk ⊂ V and p1, . . . ,pk ∈ V such that
V (TS) = V \ ∪kj=1BQjpj ,
where pj is a passage for all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}.
Proof. Any trunk T has a representation where V (T ) is obtained by removing branches
from V . This is trivial as any single node is a branch in itself if we trim all its children.
The only thing we need to prove is that these branches can be picked in such way that each
of them originates from a passage. Let {p1, . . . ,pk} ⊂ V \ V (TS) denote those passages
that connect to V (TS) from the outside, i.e. for which pi(pj) ∈ V (TS) for all j = 1, . . . , k.
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Due to the deﬁnition of TS there exists at least one such passage. Let us remind the reader
that TS is the trunk that has maximum number of arcs among the cheapest subgraphs
that connect S to the root. Therefore any junction that connects to a such trunk with a
zero arc by deﬁnition is included in TS even if no player of S resides there. If we remove
all the Bp1 , . . . , Bpk branches from V it can happen that we removed some nodes in V (TS)
as well i.e. V \ (∪kj=1Bpj) ⊂ V (TS). In order to retain all the nodes of V (TS) we trim
the Bpj branches where they intersect with V (TS). Let Qj = V (TS) ∩ Bpj then BQjpj is a
proper branch for any j and V (TS) = V \ (∪kj=1BQjpj ).
The obtained V \ ∪kj=1BQjpj expression is called the standard representation of V (TS),
if the redundant nodes have been removed from the Qj sets, i.e. each B
Qj
pj branch is in
standard form.
5 The core of the canonized DAG-game
The following extension of the cost function will be needed. We deﬁne τ(Q,S) as the cost
of the arcs in TS that go out from node set Q, i.e.
τ(Q,S)
def
=
∑
a∈(∪q∈QAq)∩A(TS)
δ(a).
In our ﬁrst lemma we show that the core of a canonized DAG-network game is never
empty.
Lemma 5. C(ΓD) 6= ∅ for any DAG-network D in canonical form.
Proof. We deﬁne the standard allocation xˆ of ΓD as follows. For each player i ∈ N let
xˆ(i) = δ(ap)|N(p)| where i ∈ N(p) and ap is one of the leaving TN -arcs of p. We claim that xˆ
is a core allocation. Let V ? ⊆ V denote the set of occupied nodes in G and let B ⊂ V be
arbitrary. Note that unoccupied nodes can only be junctions, which have a leaving zero
arc, i.e. δ(ap) = 0 for all p ∈ B \ V ?. Then
xˆ(N(B)) =
∑
p∈B∩V ?
|N(p)| · δ(ap)|N(p)| =
∑
p∈B∩V ?
δ(ap) +
∑
p∈B\V ?
δ(ap) = τ(B,N). (1)
In conclusion, xˆ(N(B)) = τ(B,N) for any node set B. In particular, xˆ(N) =
τ(V,N) = cD(N). On the other hand, for any S ⊆ N
xˆ(S) =
∑
p∈R(S)
|S ∩N(p)| · δ(ap)|N(p)| ≤
∑
p∈R(S)
δ(ap) ≤
∑
p∈V (TS)
δ(ap) ≤ C(TS) = cD(S),
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where R(S) = {R(i) : i ∈ S}. The last inequality holds, because ∑p∈V (TS) δ(ap) collects
the cost of the cheapest arcs of each node in TS, but A(TS) may contain shortcuts as
well.
The standard allocation is similar to the Bird-rule which was proposed for MCST
games (Bird, 1976). There is an extensive literature devoted to the various solution
concepts of MCST games. Without attempting to be comprehensive we refer the reader
to (Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga, 2007; Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2010; Trudeau, 2012).
Notice that, by monotonicity of the characteristic function, core vectors are non-
negative. Indeed, xi = x(N) − x(N \ i) ≥ cD(N) − cD(N \ i) ≥ 0 for any i ∈ N and
x ∈ C(ΓD).
The following deﬁnitions will be useful. We say that node q is a key ancestor of node
p, if there are two paths in TN from p to q such that these paths are arc-disjoint except
maybe for some zero arcs (semi-arc-disjoint from now on). The degenerate case when
these two paths completely coincide is also included in this deﬁnition. Thus if there leads
a zero cost path from p to q then q is a key ancestor of p. Clearly, each junction has
at least one key ancestor. On the other hand, by property P2, a passage could not have
a key ancestor, so we deﬁne the only key ancestor of a passage to be itself. For similar
reasons we deﬁne the root to be the key ancestor of itself.
The principal ancestor of node p is a unique node q ∈ V , denoted by Π(p) that is a
key ancestor of p and q ≺ q′ for every other key ancestor q′ of p (i.e. the key ancestor
closest to the root5). Notice that a junction can not be a principal ancestor of any of its
descendants. The only principal ancestor that is not a passage is the root.
Deﬁnition 6. We say that an occupied node p is free if x(N(p)) = 0 for any core element
x, i.e. the residents of p do not have to pay to get connected to the root. An unoccupied
node p is called free if Π(p) = r. The set of free nodes is denoted by F .
Note that if p is a passage then the standard allocation would assign positive value
to N(p). In other words every free node is a junction. In our next theorem we will
characterize the set of free nodes. Before we proceed let us state a simple lemma that will
play a crucial role in the proof.
Lemma 7. Let BQp be any branch originating from node p. If exc(N(V \Bp), y) = 0 for
any core allocation y, then y(N(BQp )) ≤ τ(BQp , N). In other words the residents of BQp do
not pay more than the costs of their TN -arcs.
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose for some y ∈ C(Γ), y(N(BQp )) > τ(BQp , N),
then
5In the Appendix, we provide an eﬃcient algorithm that ﬁnds the principal ancestor of each node in
a DAG-network.
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cD(N((V \Bp) ∪BQp ))) = cD(N(V \Bp)) + τ(BQp , N)
exc(N((V \Bp) ∪BQp ))), y) = 0 + τ(BQp , N)− y(N(BQp )) < 0
would contradict the non-negativity of excesses.
Naturally nodes that can reach the root via a zero cost path are free, but there are
less obvious instances. The next theorem gathers the type of nodes that are free.
Theorem 8. Node p belongs to F if and only if Π(p) = r.
Proof. If p is unoccupied we have nothing to prove, therefore we may assume that
|N(p)| > 0.
First we prove the only if part. Suppose p is a free node but its principal ancestor q
is a passage. We modify the standard allocation in the following way. Let ip a resident
of p and iq a resident of q and let
y(ip) = ε,
y(iq) = xˆ(iq)− ε,
y(j) = xˆ(j) for any other player j ∈ N,
where ε > 0 is a suﬃciently small real number (ε = mina∈A δ(a)|N |+1 will do). Note that xˆ(iq) > 0
due to P2. We prove that y ∈ C(ΓD). If S is such that ip, iq ∈ S then y(S) = xˆ(S).
If ip 6∈ S 3 iq then y(S) < xˆ(S). The only interesting case is when ip ∈ S 63 iq. If
aq ∈ A(TS) then
y(S) = y(S \ ip) + ε ≤ xˆ(S \ ip) + xˆ(iq) ≤ xˆ(S ∪N(q)) ≤ cD(S ∪N(q)) = cD(S),
where the last equality comes from the fact that N(q) can join S for free as S builds aq
anyway. If aq 6∈ A(TS) then there is at least one shortcut in TS. Let this shortcut be a′.
Then
y(S) = y(S \ ip) + ε = xˆ(S \ ip) + ε ≤ τ(R(S), N) + δ(a′) ≤ cD(S),
where we used that xˆ(S \ ip) ≤ τ(R(S), N) by (1). The last inequality is obviously true
since apart from the cheapest arcs that leave R(S), the members of S need to build at
least one shortcut, namely a′. We can not overestimate the costs as the cheapest arc that
leave the origin of a′  the cost of which is included in τ(R(S), N)  is a zero arc due to
P1. To justify the other direction we prove a slightly stronger statement.
Lemma 9. If Π(p) = r then p is free and exc(N(V \Bp), x) = 0 for any x ∈ C(ΓD).
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Let d(q) denote the size of the shortest path in TN leading from q to r. We proceed
by induction on d(p). If d(p) = 0 then p is the root for which exc(N(V \ Br), x) =
exc({∅}, x) = 0 is satisﬁed. Let us assume that d(p) = l and the lemma is true for any
node p′ with d(p′) < l where l > 0 integer. Two cases are possible. The ﬁrst is when one
of p's parent is free. Let this node be denoted by f (see Figure 4, Example I.) and let y be
an arbitrary core element. Applying the induction step we obtain exc(N(V \Bf ), y) = 0.
Both p and f are junctions therefore cD(N(V \ Bf )) = cD(N((V \ Bf ) ∪ {p})). Hence
y(N(p)) > 0 would imply exc(N((V \Bf ) ∪ {p}), y) < 0  a contradiction.
Example I. Example II.
f
p
p
q2
q1
f
r
Bp
Bf
V \Bf
Bp
V \Bf
B2
B1
Figure 4: Subgraphs of TN . Dashed lines indicate a path or paths.
The second case is when none of p's parent is free. As the principal ancestor of p is the
root p must be a gate. There leads paths from p to r in TN which are semi-arc-disjoint.
There may be some intermediary nodes that coincide on these paths. Let the ﬁrst such
node denoted by f (see Figure 4, Example II.). Note that the principal ancestor of f is
the root (f may be the root itself) therefore we can apply the induction step. That means
that f is free and exc(N(V \ Bf ), y) = 0 for any core allocation y. This also implies that
τ(Bf , N) = y(N(Bf )).
There leads two arc-disjoint path from p to f in TN . Let q1 and q2 be the direct
ancestors of p that lie on these paths. We can separate the node set Bf \ Bp into two
f -branch B1 and B2 such that q1 ∈ B1, q2 ∈ B2 and B1 ∩ B2 = {f}. For instance such a
partition can be obtained by coloring the path from q1 to f red and the path from q2 to f
blue (as f is contained in both paths we can pick either one of the colors, say red). Then
we color each node one-by-one in Bf \Bp in the following way. Take a direct descendant
of a colored node. If it has a red parent we paint it red, if it has a blue one we paint it
blue. If it has both a red and a blue parent paint it arbitrarily with one color. Let B1
contain the red nodes, while B2 the blue ones in addition with f . Indeed the node sets
deﬁned in this way are f -branches which satisfy B1 ∪ B2 = Bf \ Bp and B1 ∩ B2 = {f}.
This leads us to
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y(N(Bf )) = τ(Bf , N) = τ(B1 ∪Bp, N) + τ(B2, N)
[τ(B1 ∪Bp, N)− y(N(B1 ∪Bp))] + [τ(B2, N)− y(N(B2)))] = 0.
We implicitly used that f is a junction, therefore its cheapest arc is a zero arc. Fur-
thermore y(N(f)) = 0 since f is free. Therefore it implies no additional cost that both B1
and B2 contain f . The node set B1∪Bp is an f -branch and so is B2, therefore the sums in
the square brackets are non-negative by Lemma 7. It follows that τ(B2, N) = y(N(B2)).
Now let us move the Bp branch from B1 to B2. With exactly the same argument we can
show that τ(B1, N) = y(N(B1)). As N(B1) and N(B2) pay only for their own branch's
construction cost i.e. the cost of the cheapest arcs that leave the B1 and B2 branch. From
N(Bp) = N(Bf ) \ N(B1 ∪ B2) it follows that exc(N(V \ Bp), y) = 0. By Lemma 7 the
BQp branch pays at most τ(B
Q
p , N) for any Q ⊂ Bp. In particular y(N(p)) = 0 for any
core element y, i.e. p is free. This concludes the proof of Lemma 9 and Theorem 8.
A coalition S is said to be saturated if i ∈ S whenever c(S) = c(S ∪ {i}). Granot,
Granot and Zhu proved that saturated coalitions together with the grand coalition and
the n−1 player coalitions characterize the nucleolus of any monotone cost game (Granot,
Granot, and Zhu, 1998). Moreover the eﬃciency equation x(N) = c(N) and the x(S) ≤
c(S) inequalities corresponding to the saturated coalitions determine the core of such
games as well. In the light of these two result we may restrict our attention to this
type of coalitions. In case of DAG-games this property comes with a nice structure.
Saturated coalitions incorporate every player of the trunk on which they reside, formally
S is saturated if and only if S = N(V (TS)).
There are many coalitions whose excess is zero in any core allocation. For instance it
is easy to prove that if p is a passage that is a direct descendant of the root, then N(Bp)
is such a coalition. In the following we characterize the set of saturated coalitions that
bear this property. Let S0 denote the set of saturated coalitions whose excess is zero for
any core allocation, formally
S0 def= {S ⊆ N | S saturated and c(S) = x(S) for any x ∈ C(Γ)}.
In our next lemma we identify certain branches that pay only for their own construction
cost i.e. the cost of the cheapest arcs that leave the branch. A BQp branch is called a
building block if it has the following properties:
• p is a passage whose parent is free,
• all the nodes in Q are free,
• BQp does not contain a free node.
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Lemma 10. If BQp is a building block, then x(N(B
Q
p )) = τ(B
Q
p , N) for any core allocation
x.
Proof. Since pi(p) is free, it is a junction and x(N(pi(p))) = 0. We know from Lemma
9 that exc(N(V \ Bpi(p)), x) = 0 for any core allocation x. It follows that exc(N((V \
Bpi(p)) ∪ {pi(p)}), x) = 0 is also true. With a similar argument as in Lemma 7 it can be
shown that x(N(BQp )) ≤ τ(BQp , N).
Each node of Q has (at least) two semi-arc-disjoint paths that leads to the root. As
BQp does not contain a free node one of these paths for each node by-passes B
Q
p . We
prove this by contradiction. Let q ∈ Q an arbitrary free node. Suppose there exists two
semi-arc-disjoint paths in TN , P1 and P2 that leads from q to the root and crosses B
Q
p .
Let q1 ∈ BQp ∩V (P1) be such that there exist no other q′ ∈ BQp ∩V (P1) such that q′ ≺ q1.
Similarly let q2 be the node closest to the root that is an element of both B
Q
p and P2. As
q1 and q2 lie on semi-arc-disjoint paths, one of them  say q1  is not p. Thus the P1
path leaves the BQp node set at q1 on a zero-arc. There leads a path in TN from q1 to pi(p)
through BQp that is arc-disjoint of P1. As pi(p) is free there leads two semi-arc-disjoint
paths P3 and P4 from pi(p) to the root. Without loss of generality we may assume that
P1 intersects with P3 ﬁrst (or at the same time as it intersects with P4). Let us denote
this node by q∗. Note that if q∗ is a common node of P3 and P4 it is a junction, otherwise
the two paths would not be semi-arc-disjoint. Let PA be the path that starts from q1,
follows P1 till q
∗, then reaches the root following P3. Let PB be the path that originates
at q1,reaches pi(p) using only TN -arcs and nodes from B
Q
p , and goes to the root following
P4. By construction PA and PB are semi-arc-disjoint, thus q1 is free, which contradicts
the assumption that BQp is a building block.
It follows that there exists a path in TN for every q ∈ Q that leads to the root, that
does not pass through any node of BQp . A straightforward consequence is that B
Q
p is a
proper branch and every node in V \BQp can reach the root by using only TN -arcs. Note
that there is no zero-arc that leaves BQp and enters in V \BQp , otherwise BQp would contain
a free node. Thus the node set V \BQp corresponds to a trunk, namely to TN(V \BQp ). Finally
for any core allocation x
cD(N) = cD(N(V \BQp )) + τ(BQp , N)
0 = [cD(N(V \BQp ))− x(N(V \BQp ))] + [τ(BQp , N)− x(N(BQp ))]
0 = [exc(N(V \BQp )), x)] + [τ(BQp , N)− x(N(BQp ))]
Both expressions in the square brackets are non-negative, thus x(N(BQp )) = τ(B
Q
p , N).
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Lemma 11. Let ∪kj=1BFjpj be a union of branches such that pj is a passage, pi(pj) ∈ F
and Fj ⊂ F for j = 1, . . . , k. Then ∪kj=1BFjpj can be decomposed into a disjoint union of
building blocks and free nodes.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the number of nodes. If ∪kj=1BFjpj consist of
a single node, then k = 1 and BF1p1 must be a building block. Now suppose the lemma
is true for node sets with less than l nodes and let | ∪kj=1 BFjpj | = l. Let BQp1 be a branch
where Q = Bp1 ∩ F and let BQ′p1 be the standard form of this branch. Note that BQ
′
p1
is a
building block and it is a subset of BF1p1 . Let us delete B
Q′
p1
from BF1p1 . If Q
′ ∩ BF1p1 is not
empty we delete those nodes too (these are free as all the nodes of Q′ are free). If some
descendant of a node in Q′ is a junction then it is free therefore it can be deleted too. If
we deleted all the free nodes in this way and there are still some nodes in BF1p1 then those
must be passages. Let us denote these by p′1, . . . ,p
′
K . Note that pi(p
′
1), . . . , pi(p
′
K) ∈ F .
Hence the remaining nodes can be written as ∪Ki=1BF1p′i ∪
k
j=2 B
Fj
pj . By reindexing p
′
i we are
done as | ∪Ki=1 BF1p′i ∪
k
j=2 B
Fj
pj | < l.
Now we are ready to characterize the set S0.
Theorem 12. S ∈ S0 if and only if V (TS) can be written as
V (TS) = V \ ∪kj=1BFjpj
where pj is a passage pi(pj) ∈ F and Fj ⊂ F for all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}.
Proof. In the light of Lemma 10 and Lemma 11 the only if part can be veriﬁed easily.
If the trunk of coalition S can be represented as V (TS) = V \ ∪kj=1BFjpj , then V (TS) is
the complement of a disjoint union of building blocks and free nodes. As the residents of
building blocks and the free nodes pay only for their own construction cost, the rest of
the players have to pay for their own part of TN . Thus from the cD(N) = x(N) equality
it follows that cD(S) = x(S) for any core allocation x. Note that we implicitly used that
every resident of V (TS) is involved in building TS, that is S is saturated.
Now we prove the other direction i.e. S ∈ S0 ⇒ V (TS) = V \ ∪kj=1BFjpj . From Lemma
4 we know that we can choose a representation of V (TS) where pj  the origin of the
removed B
Fj
pj branch  is a passage for all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}. Furthermore pi(pj) ∈ V (TS)
and Fj ⊂ V (TS) for all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}.
If TS has a shortcut then the standard allocation induces a non-zero excess for S.
It follows that TS is a connected subgraph of TN . First let us consider a simple graph
structure when only one branch is missing, that is V (TS) = V \ BQp . If pi(p) is not free
then there exist a core allocation y where y(N(p)) > τ(p, N). The argument is similar
to the reasoning used in the ﬁrst part of Theorem 8. As pi(p) is not free, Π(pi(p)) is
a passage. A coalition that contains a player from N(p) has to use this passage or go
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around with a shortcut. In either case the standard allocation can be modiﬁed: a little
amount can be transferred from N(Π(pi(p))) to N(p) without leaving the core. Thus if
the excess of N(V \ BQp ) was zero under the standard allocation it is not zero under y.
Now let V (TS) = V \ ∪kj=1BFjpj and let us use the standard representation of V (TS). Take
an arbitrary pi(pj). Basically the same argument works as above, we only need to show
that Π(pi(pj)) is in V (TS). Suppose on the contrary that Π(pi(pj)) 6∈ V (TS). We know
that every path from pi(pj) to the root that lies in TN crosses Π(pi(pj)). Since TS is a
subgraph of TN it follows that pi(pj) 6∈ V (TS). However in the standard representation
pj was chosen such way that pi(pj) ∈ V (TS)  a contradiction.
Finally we need to prove that if Fj 6⊂ F then S 6∈ S0. Let f be an arbitrary non-free
element of a given Fj. There leads a path in TN from f to pi(pj) through B
Fj
pj . There
leads another path in TS, arc-disjoint from the previous one to the root. By our previous
observation if this path contains a shortcut, then S 6∈ S0. Thus this path lies entirely in
TN . Since pi(pj) is free there leads two semi-arc-disjoint paths from pi(pj) to the root. It
is impossible that the path from f to the root intersects both of these paths at a passage,
since then they would not be semi-arc-disjoint. Thus there exist two semi-arc-disjoint
paths from f to the root i.e. f is free.
Notice that this direction did not require for coalition S to be saturated. Non-saturated
coalitions can have zero excess in the core, in particular when there are occupied free nodes
in the trunk of S.
The interpretation of Theorem 12 becomes simpler when we consider the free nodes as
some kind of secondary roots. The residents of a free node do not have to pay (Theorem
8), and the residents of a full branch that originates from a free node pay only for their own
branch's construction cost (a consequence of Lemmas 9 and 7). A natural simpliﬁcation
would be to contract the free nodes with the root. Unfortunately this transformation
would alter the characteristic function of the game, therefore we follow another approach
to describe the core.
The next lemma gives an upper bound on how much certain branches are willing to
pay in the core. Let as be a shortcut that originates from a non-free node p. We say that
as is critical if replacing as with a zero arc would set p free.
Lemma 13. Let p be a junction with a critical shortcut as ∈ Ap. If BQp is a p-branch
then x(N(BQp )) ≤ τ(BQp , N) + δ(as) for any core allocation x.
Proof. If we replaced as with a zero arc, there would exist two semi-arc-disjoint paths
from p to the root. One that leads through an original zero arc of p, and one through as.
We will use a similar argument as in Lemma 9. We color the nodes of the former path
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p
as
0
BQp
B2
Figure 5: Schematic picture of D. Dashed lines indicate branches.
red while the nodes of the latter path blue. The nodes contained in both paths (e.g. the
root) are assigned both colors, except for p that is painted only red. Then we color each
node in V one-by-one in the following way. Take a direct descendant of a colored node.
If it has a red parent we paint it red, if it has a blue one we paint it blue. If it has both a
red and a blue parent we paint it red. Among the possible colorings we chose one where
every node in BQp was painted red. Let B1 contain the red nodes, while B2 the blue ones.
Every node has been assigned at least one color i.e. B1 ∪B2 = V . The intersection of B1
and B2 contains nodes that coincide on the red and the blue paths. These nodes are free
by construction. In TN(B1) and TN(B2) every player can reach the root by using only arcs
of TN . Thus if x is an arbitrary core allocation, then
cD(N) = cD(N(B1)) + cD(N(B2)),
cD(N)− x(N)− x(N(B1 ∩B2)) = cD(N(B1))− x(N(B1)) + cD(N(B2))− x(N(B2)),
0 = exc(N(B1), x) + exc(N(B2), x),
where the last equality comes from the fact that x(N(B1 ∩ B2)) = 0, as (B1 ∩ B2) ⊂ F .
From the non-negativity of the excesses we obtain that exc(N(B2), x) = 0. Finally
0 ≤ cD(N(B2 ∪BQp )) ≤ cD(N(B2)) + δ(as) + τ(BQp , N),
0 ≤ exc(N(B2 ∪BQp ), x) ≤ cD(N(B2))− x(N(B2)) + δ(as) + τ(BQp , N)− x(N(BQp )),
0 ≤ 0 + δ(as) + τ(BQp , N)− x(N(BQp )).
Next we uncover the graph structure of dually essential coalitions. As it will turn
out it is simple and easy to deal with. First we show that dual essentiality is a stricter
property than saturatedness.
Lemma 14. In a DAG-network game dually essential coalitions are either saturated or
consist of n− 1 players.
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Proof. Let S be a non-saturated coalition with at most n − 2 players. We will show
that S is dually inessential. As S is not saturated there exists i ∈ N \ S such that
cD(S) = cD(S ∪ {i}). Let S1 := S ∪ {i} and S2 := N \ {i}. Then S1 ∪ S2 = N and
S1 ∩ S2 = S therefore we can use Deﬁnition 2 since
cD(N) ≥ cD(N \ {i}),
cD(S) ≥ cD(S) + cD(N \ {i})− cD(N),
cD(S) ≥ cD(S1) + cD(S2)− cD(N).
In other words S appears in an overlapping decomposition of S1 and S2, therefore it can
not be dually essential.
The following theorem characterizes dually essential coalitions.
Theorem 15. The dually essential coalitions of the cost game ΓD are the coalitions with
n − 1 player and saturated coalitions whose trunks correspond to node sets of the form
V \BUq where BUq is a proper branch and q is a passage.
Proof. We have already seen in Lemma 14 that only saturated and n−1 player coalitions
are dually essential. By Lemma 4 we know that trunks of (saturated) coalitions can be
generated by removing branches from G. The one thing we have to prove is that coalitions
that correspond to trunks that have more missing branches are dually inessential. Let S
be a saturated coalition for which V (TS) = V \∪kj=1BQjpj where k ≥ 2. As D is in canonical
form there resides at least one player in each of the branches. Note that in the standard
representation of V (TS), each of the Qj node sets is either empty or a subset of V (TS).
For convenience's sake let us introduce the following notation B1 = ∪k−1j=1BQjpj and
B2 = B
Qk
pk
. Then let S1 = N \N(B1) and S2 = N \N(B2). In this way S1 ∪ S2 = N and
S1 ∩ S2 = S. To prove that cD(S) ≥ cD(S1) + cD(S2) − cD(N) holds as well it is enough
to show that the following two inequalities are true.
cD(S1) ≤ cD(S) + τ(B2, N)− τ(Qk, S) (2)
cD(S2) ≤ cD(N)− τ(B2, N) + τ(Qk, S) (3)
Note that it takes at most τ(B2, N) to connect the players residing at B2 to TS. As
BQkpk is a proper branch it follows that the nodes in Qk are junctions. Since the nodes in
Qk are direct ancestors of some nodes in B2 they are connected with zero arcs. Therefore
we can save at least τ(Qk, S) amount of cost by connecting Qk through the branch B2
and not through the arcs in (∪q∈QkAq) ∩ A(TS). It is possible that aside from Qk there
are other nodes that can reach the root in a cheaper way using the arcs of B2, but no
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nodes of V (TS) is forced to take a more expensive path. Summarizing the above ﬁndings
we gather that
cD(S1) ≤ cD(S) + τ(B2, N)− τ(Qk, S)
We can estimate cD(S2) by keeping track how the cost changes as we swift from
TN to TS2 . As N(B2) are not in S2 we can delete B2 and subtract τ(B2, N) amount
of cost from cD(N). Deleting B2 from TN only the direct descendants of B2 can get
disconnected. Therefore the only nodes that may not be connected to the root are Qk
and their descendants. By building (∪q∈QkAq) ∩ A(TS)  the exact same arcs that we
deleted in case of S1  we can ensure that every node in V \ B2 \ {r} has a leaving
arc. None of these arcs enter to B2, thus we obtained a trunk. Therefore the cost of
reconnecting Qk is at most τ(Qk, S). Altogether we can estimate the cost of S2 by
cD(S2) ≤ cD(N)− τ(B2, N) + τ(Qk, S).
Now adding (2) and (3) together, then subtracting cD(N) from both sides yield us the
desired result.
Notice that Theorem 15 is surprisingly analogous to the one derived by Maschler,
Potters, and Reijnierse (2010) for standard tree games (see Lemma 2.3 in the cited paper).
Although they do not speak of characterization sets the relationship between the two result
is unquestionable.
Whether the core can be described eﬃciently with dually essential coalitions, depends
on how many distinct proper branches of standard form exist in the network. Unfor-
tunately as the next example shows there can be exponentially many dually essential
coalitions in a DAG-game.
q1{1} qj{j} qn{n}
p{n+1}
r
0 0 0
1
. . . . . .
ε ε ε
Figure 6: A DAG-network with exponential many proper branches. Solid lines indicate
TN -arcs, while dotted lines are shortcuts.
Consider the DAG-network depicted in Figure 6. The root has only one direct descen-
dant, namely p, while the nodes q1, . . . ,qn are the children of p. Each of the qj nodes
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have one additional arc  a shortcut  that enters the root. The cost of the shortcuts
are chosen in such way that their total cost is less than the cost of the TN -arc of p. For
instance let δ(ap) = 1, and δ(as) = ε =
1
n+1
for each shortcut as ∈ A. Let us assume that
one player resides in each node, the jth player at qj and the (n+ 1)st player at p. Let N
′
denote the set of the ﬁrst n player. For an arbitrary S ⊂ N ′, TS correspond to V \ BQSp ,
where QS
def
= {qj| j ∈ S}. Thus any subset of N ′ is dually essential. As there are n player
in N ′ there are at least 2n dually essential coalitions in this game.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we introduced a new class of cooperative cost game that is based on directed
acyclic graph networks. We analyzed the properties of the game and gave suﬃcient
conditions for the non-emptiness of the core. We identiﬁed 'free riders', i.e. players that
does not pay anything in any core allocation. Additionally, we characterized coalitions
that have a constant zero excess in the core. We also introduced the concept of dually
essential coalitions - a class of coalitions which are suﬃcient in themselves to determine
the linear inequality system that describes the core or the nucleolus.
Considering their structure and complexity directed acyclic graph games lie somewhere
between standard tree games and monotonic minimum cost spanning tree games. There
is a vast amount of literature concerning both of these class of games. It is an interesting
question how the known results relate to DAG-games. One diﬃculty that arises with
the appearance of shortcuts  i.e. when we extend the network structure from standard
tree to a directed acyclic graph  is that determining the cost of a coalition becomes
computationally hard. Finding the cheapest trunk that connects a set of nodes to the root
is equivalent to the so called acyclic directed Steiner tree problem, which is known to be
NP-hard. That is, even if the cardinality of the dually essential coalitions is polynomially
bounded from above, we will not be able to eﬃciently determine the core by a linear
program. Nevertheless, we believe that the structural results presented here, especially
the characterization of the set of free nodes and the S0 set, will compose the basis of any
further analysis that focuses on the core and related allocations.
The complexity issue related to the computation of the characteristic function also
emerges for monotonic minimum cost spanning tree games. For this latter class of games
ﬁnding the nucleolus is in itself NP-hard (Faigle, Kern, and J., 1998). It seems that the
hardness comes from the undirectedness of the edges, and its unrelated to how many
players reside in a node. In a DAG-network payments ﬂow in one direction, toward the
root which makes the players hierarchically structured. Thus it seems possible that some
kind of painting algorithm works for DAG-networks (Maschler, Potters, and Reijnierse,
2010). In a subsequent paper we will provide an eﬃcient algorithm that ﬁnds the nucleolus
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for canonized directed acyclic graph games.
A possibility to expand the model is to consider more service provider, i.e. more
than one root in the graph. Since the free nodes are already behaving like some kind
of secondary roots, this will not change the character or diﬃculty of the problem. Our
conjecture is that contracting the free nodes with the root results in a game where the
core and the nucleolus is unchanged. However this transformation alters the characteristic
function of the game.
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Appendix A
Let us provide a simple method to identify the principal ancestor of each node in TN .
Double every zero arc in TN and set the capacity of every arc to 1. Now determining the
key ancestors of a node p becomes easy. Let fpq denote the maximum ﬂow between p
and q. If fpq ≥ 2, then q is a key ancestor of p. The key ancestor closest to the root will
be the principal ancestor. Note that P4 is not needed as the algorithm works with TN
This is a very costly way to map the principal ancestors of the nodes, it takes around
O(m5) time, where m denotes the number of nodes in G. It seems likely that by dynamic
programming the running time can be reduced to O(m3) or even lower. However our goal
was to prove that this problem can be solved in polynomial time. We leave the question
of eﬃciency to future research.
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